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Abstract
The key actor within the scope of refugee education has been shifting from external 
agencies to the refugees themselves over time. In recent years, refugees have taken 
the initiative to fulfill their demands for education. Ninety percent of Syrian refugees 
residing in Turkey live outside of the refugee camp and some part of them run  
independent schools in urban areas. However, the actual dynamics of their education 
are not outwardly reflected in statistics such as school enrollment ratio and remain 
largely unknown.
The objective of this study is to examine the school operation mechanisms  
managed by Syrian urban refugees. The fieldwork took place in two southern  
Turkish provinces adjacent to the Syrian border for nine weeks in total during 2013 
and 2015. Interviews and participant observations were conducted with Syrian 
school stakeholders.
This study reveals four factors below as characteristics of elements allowing 
school education by Syrian refugees in Turkey to function: (1) Partial cooperative 
relationship between the stakeholders of the education for Syrian refugees; (2)  
Involvement of Turkish governmental organizations and responses by each school; 
(3) Connections between international/domestic supporters and Syrian schools; and 
(4) Ensuring diploma certificates and the impact the certificates have on student 
lives.
Currently, it is difficult for unstably managed Syrian schools alone to respond  
to all the educational demands from Syrian refugees hoping for bridges to higher 
education. However, it is true that the expansion of education is being facilitated by 
activities by Syrian refugees themselves.
Key words: Syrian refugees; Turkey; refugee-run school education; urban refugees 
in non-camp areas
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ENSURING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHILDREN  
IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED CONTEXTS:  






Even after fleeing from conflict and evacuating to safe grounds, refugee children still face 
many threats in their daily lives. These threats include issues that involve society as a whole, 
such as loss of access to public services including education. Moreover, there are also damages 
for individuals which impacts children’s lives for a long period of time, which is physical and 
mental violence due to conflicts and their social psychological impacts (Davies 2004; Muldoon 
2013). Conflicts have tremendous negative effects on education, such as functional difficulties 
of educational facilities due to their destruction, use as tentative shelters, and shortage of 
educational personnel (Machel 2000; Sinclair 2005; Demirdjian 2011). Due to these 
circumstances, refugees become one of the groups with the largest difficulty getting access to 
education (Sinclair 2007).
The number of refugee children who are 18 years old or younger accounts for 51% of the total 
population of 19.5 million refugees, which equates to 9.95 million refugee children worldwide 
(UNHCR 2015a: 3). Their school enrollment ratio is estimated at 76% for primary education and 
36% for secondary education (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 6). Expansion of education for conflict-
affected children including refugees is essential for achieving the goals of Education for All 
(EFA). The implementation of EFA was emphasized with respect to the Dakar Framework for 
Action selected in the World Education Forum in 2000 (Komatsu 2005: 220). The Incheon 
Declaration that was adopted at the same forum held in May of 2015 also refers to education in 
conflict-affected situation (World Education Forum 2015: 2–3). The Declaration states that an 
“inclusive, responsive, and resilient” educational system must be developed for internally 
displaced people (IDPs) and refugees, considering that most of the out-of-school population live 
in conflict-affected areas (Ibid.).
For refugee children and their families, going to school can be a means to re-establish the daily 
routine that they have lost due to conflicts, and education can be an investment towards their 
future lives (Utsumi 2005; Komatsu 2005: 210). Additionally, education is expected to protect 
children from daily threats (Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003: 9–10). Thus recognition on the 
importance of education is internationally shared. However, educational situation of refugees in 
the majority of nations, including developed countries, have not been apparent in statistics. 
Though education may be raised as one of the top policy priority for humanitarian assistance, it 
is not regarded as important as life necessities in emergencies (Bird 2003).
Until the 1990s, the main actors who provided educational support to refugees were 
governments or UN agencies. Since 2000s, NGOs took over part of the role, and the key 
educational actors became those who are much closer to the field (UNESCO 2015). Additionally, 
along with the increase of urban refugee population1), the trends of refugee lives have been 
1) This is not necessarily limited to refer to settlers in urban areas, but all non-camp refugees.
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changing. Along with changes such as urbanization, the distribution of refugee population 
becomes similar to that of non-refugee population (Jacobsen 2006). Today, more refugees head 
to cities and towns instead of camps and shelters in rural areas. Unlike refugee camps where 
people live in collective residential areas under management of the host government or UN 
agencies, lives of urban refugees become diversified; simultaneously, the humanitarian aid 
required by those various people becomes more complex. This is why NGOs, which are able to 
give support for refugees more attentively, have come to hold a leading position also in the field 
of educational implementation for refugees. Furthermore, in recent years, more diversified needs 
for satisfying refugees’ welfare including education that are even difficult for NGOs to tackle, 
are being fulfilled through activities conducted by refugees themselves.
The Syrian Arab Republic fell into a state of conflict in 2011 to become the country generating 
the world’s largest amount of refugees in 2014 (UNHCR 2015a: 14). As of 2015, one out of six 
Syrians seeks asylum outside Syria and becomes a refugee2). A characteristic of Syrian refugees 
is their tendency to head to urban areas. Of approximately 4 million Syrian refugees residing in 
5 neighboring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt), 85% of them are living 
outside of camps (UNHCR 2015a: 43). In particular, 90% of Syrian refugees who have evacuated 
to Turkey accommodate outside of camps (calculated by the author from the chart in Erdogan 
2014: 54). They are living in urban areas where it is difficult to receive external support, and are 
surviving by using individual living means. Activities conducted by the refugees themselves 
have developed to the level of school administration. Refugees have already become beneficiaries 
of educational support as well as actors of education provision. Despite this, the actual status 
of educational activities run by refugees remains unclear.
The purpose of this study is to examine the school education mechanism that ensures schooling 
for urban refugee children, while focusing on the perspective of Syrian school stakeholders in 
Turkey based on case studies at schools operated by refugees. This paper first examines previous 
studies on refugee education focusing on urban refugees as well as refugee-run school education 
(Section 1). It will also grasp the educational situation of the people in Syria before the conflict 
and in the neighboring countries after the conflict has erupted (Section 2), and take on a bird’s 
eye view of Syrian refugee acceptance and enrollment to schools in Turkey (Section 3). Then 
after presenting the outline of fieldwork conducted at the border area with Syria in southern 
Turkey (Section 4), it will organize the main actors that are involved in school administration 
for Syrian urban refugees in order to elucidate the function and role of each stakeholder as well 
as about the dynamics of the school education created in associations among the main actors 
(Section 5). Finally, this paper will examine the functions which both promote and hamper 
school administration operations by Syrian refugees following the discussion in the previous 
sections (Section 6).
2) Of all 23 million Syrian citizens, 4.01 million became refugees (UNHCR 2015b).
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1. Literature review on refugee education
1.1 Urban refugees and schools
Humanitarian aids that urban refugees can receive from external organizations are 
comparatively little in comparison to what refugees in camps do. This inevitably makes the 
relationship between urban refugees and school education different from that of camp refugees. 
As urban refugees blend into the host community in many cases, statistics of their education 
and even demographics are uncertain. Despite this uncertainty, according to a household survey 
conducted in 62 countries, the average of primary school enrollment ratio of urban refugees is 
64% (as of 2008, UNHCR 2009: 12), which is comparatively lower than that of refugees as a 
whole. However, the actual school enrollment ratio is likely much lower. It is because of the fact 
that public statistics often do not reveal the status of the urban refugees, as well as the fact that 
there is a growing population of urban refugees accompanying the current increase in Syrian 
refugees.
The educational configuration that is deemed ideal for urban refugees is enrollment into 
the local schools of the host country (Sinclair 2001; Dryden-Peterson 2011). In this case, the 
main educational support for urban refugees is provision of funds necessary for schooling, 
such as scholarship programs which aim for quantitative expansion of refugees’ enrollment 
(Dryden-Peterson 2011). Furthermore, for the purpose of qualitative improvement, adaptation 
to different languages and curriculums is promoted, and integration into local schools is urged 
after eliminating discrimination and harassment that refugees receive from teachers and/or 
classmates (Ibid.).
However, there are cases when the system in the country of asylum does not allow refugee 
children to attend local public schools. In such cases, it becomes necessary to establish 
non-formal educational facility for refugee children. This kind of school is often established 
in refugee camps, but there are some cases where such schools or facilities in the form of 
educational/learning centers have been built in cities (e.g. Sinclair 2001; Nirrengarten 2010; 
Rahman 2011). This being said, many of these schools are built as tentative measures in 
emergencies (Sinclair 2001: 18). That is why they have only short-time operational visions in 
many cases, and it gives rise to challenges for these schools in various aspects, such as provision 
of diploma certificates at the time of students’ graduation. Because of these challenges, this sort 
of educational facilities tend to be seen as a second option compared to local schools. Even so, 
for refugees, a school that is dedicated to them is a valuable option in that they can enjoy 
education based on their own native language, curriculum, and socio-cultural background in a 
place of refuge (Dryden-Peterson 2011). These educational activities often start after receiving 
demands from the refugee community, but the implementation of them are deeply dependent on 
involvement from external organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, or other NGOs despite 
these activities being known as the “refugee initiative.”
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1.2 “Refugee initiative” school education
Examples from various areas regarding voluntary educational activities by refugees have been 
reported since the 1970s (e.g. Dodds and Inquai 1983; Gezelius 1996; Dryden-Peterson 2011). 
Such activities were realizations of demands for education from refugees, and have increased 
educational opportunities for refugee children. However, they are always acknowledged to be 
related inseparably with support from external organizations. In many cases, refugee communities 
with a heightened awareness for education approach humanitarian organizations including 
UNHCR, UNICEF, or other international groups engaging in refugee and/or educational support, 
and establish school facilities with their aid. These cases are reported from the perspective of 
these humanitarian organizations.
International humanitarian aid organizations such as UNHCR place importance on involvement 
of external organizations for refugee education as a prevention measure, because of the concerns 
that biased political messages (mainly, strong indignation against political oppositions who are 
considered to be the cause of the refugee group’s forced migration) will be delivered to children 
or youths through education by refugee educational personnel who take leadership (Davies 
2004: 157). This is why granting full mandate of educational operation to refugees is not 
necessarily favorably regarded. In this context, “refugee initiative” merely means that the 
proportion of refugees’ will is fairly large in comparison with school administrations fully 
controlled by external organizations.
With this background of refugee education, the cases of Syrian refugees’ education in Turkey, 
which is the target of this paper, is similar to other cases in that the refugees maintain a strong 
enthusiasm towards education and try to initiate education activities by themselves. However, 
there is specificity of the case in how they build their unique education system. This paper will 
analyze how the Turkish governmental organization, the Syrian refugee’s educational actors, and 
the supporting group/individuals become connected with each other to ensure educational 
opportunities for Syrian refugee children amid the transforming trends of international aid 
regarding urban refugee education.
2. Background of Syrian refugees and their educational conditions
2.1 Conditions and education in Syria before the conflict
Syria is a country with a population of 23 million (in 2013), located on the coast of the 
Mediterranean Sea with Arabic as its official language. After the country broke free from French 
mandatory and succeeded in a coup d’état by the Ba’ath Party in 1963 led by former president 
Hafez al-Assad, the Assad regime has been exercising hereditary rule of the country for over 50 
years up to its current president, Bashar al-Assad (since 2000). The Ba’ath Party has been trying 
to unify Syria, a country of mixed characters of localities, religious groups, and ethnicities (Rabo 
1996: 167), under the umbrella of “Arab Identity,” which consists of socialism and Pan-Arabism. 
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In the preamble of the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic which was revised in 2012, it 
is stated that “The Syrian Arab Republic is proud of its Arab Identity, and… embodies this 
belonging in its national and pan-Arab project… in order to promote integration and achieve 
the unity of the Arab nation” (Syrian Arab Republic 2012). Many who were born and raised in 
Syria identify themselves as Syrian, regardless of the current conditions of the nation, and feel 
that ancestral legacies are shared with their fellow citizens (Rabo 1996: 167). Meanwhile, 
diversity of those who have been marginalized has been suppressed by the government, under 
the supposed just cause of integration into the Arab Identity. These daily pressures by the 
government are believed to be one of the causes which triggered the conflict. After March of 
2011, conflicting parties from inside and outside of Syria have mingled within the country, 
causing a critical crisis. The situation in the country is serious, with over 320 thousand deaths 
from the conflict (as of June 2015: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 2015), 7.6 million 
IDPs (as of December 2014: UNHCR 2015a), and 4.3 million refugees (as of November 2015: 
UNHCR 2015b). The majority of Syrians’ lives and livelihoods are under threat.
The Syrian school system can be classified into three stages: primary education, which lasts 
6 years from the age of 6 (1st–6th grade), intermediate education, which lasts 3 years (7th–9th 
grade), and secondary education, which also lasts 3 years (10th–12th grade) (UNESCO-IBE 
2011). Though compulsory education is provided for the 6 years of primary education, free 
education in all stages is afforded for Syrian people. Foreign language courses of English or 
French that students can select from are incorporated into primary education3). In secondary 
education, schools separate into schools for general, technical, and vocational courses (UNESCO-
IBE 2011).
Educational gaps attributable to diversity have been consistently pointed out until the 2000s 
with respect to Syria, which is home to a diverse population of citizens. Typical examples of 
these gaps are low school enrollment ratio for girls in rural areas (Rabo 1996), and oppression 
against Kurdish residents4). Because of these backgrounds, the net enrollment ratio of intermediate 
education, which is non-compulsory, is 67.1% (as of 2010: World Bank EdStats), which cannot 
be regarded as high considering that it was slightly lower than the average of the Middle Eastern 
region (69.5% in the same year: Ibid.). However, the net enrollment ratio for primary education 
in 2011 before the conflict had been maintained at a high standard of 99.1% (Ibid.), which was 
a sound progress towards EFA (UNICEF 2011). Additionally, with regard to the percentage of 
students who proceed to the secondary education from the intermediate level, boys, who had a 
3) As of 2001, foreign language courses are being implemented for 3 hours a week in 5th year primary education 
(UNESCO-IBE 2011).
4) In 1962, approximately 12,000 (20%) of Kurdish residents living in Syria were suspected to have been smuggled 
into Syria in an attempt to establish a Kurdish state (Tejel 2009: 51). Their citizenship was forfeited, and they were 
registered as “foreigners” by authorities so as to be extradited from Syrian society (Ibid.). Since then, until deregu-
lation in 2005, these residents did not possess Syrian citizenship, and were not entitled to enter the secondary educa-
tion (10th grade), which is not compulsory, nor any education afterwards.
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consistently higher percentage than girls until 2000, were exceeded by girls in 20055). The 
shrinking gender gap inflated expectations for improvement of the school enrollment ratio for 
secondary education. Because of all these improving educational situation before the war in 
Syria, education is indispensable for Syrian people even after becoming refugees. On the other 
hand, Syria, the third largest refugee-hosting country until 2011 (UNHCR 2012: 15), was not 
only fraught with educational issues for Palestine and Iraqi refugees, but also had issues with 
observation and control6) in schools by the government.
2.2 Educational trends of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries
Of the refugees from Syria, 94% reside in the five countries surrounding Syria: Turkey 
(2.2 million Syrian refugees in Turkey), Lebanon (1.08 million in Lebanon), Jordan (0.63 million 
in Jordan), Iraq (0.25 million in Iraq), and Egypt (0.13 million in Egypt) (UNHCR 2015b). 
School-aged Syrian refugees who are enrolled in primary and secondary schools in those 
countries are estimated as 31% in Lebanon, 40% in Turkey, 61% in Iraq, 85% in Jordan, and 
98% in Egypt (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2015: 2). Those four countries, excluding 
Turkey, use Arabic for their official language similar to Syria, which promotes refugee absorption 
to their local schools. Additionally, Jordan and Iraq established camps for Syrian refugees so 
that they have easier access to educational opportunities and school enrollment statistics can 
readily be gathered.
On the other hand, since there are no official camps set up in Lebanon, refugees are forced to 
stay in Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) or in regular housing. ITS is an unofficially occupied 
housing area where refugees who cannot afford to obtain a place to live in the urban area have 
settled down (UNICEF 2014: 1). People living in ITS are said to remain in the most deteriorating 
living conditions among Syrian refugees (Ibid.). Syrian refugees living in ITS are 12.5% of the 
population in Lebanon, and other 85% in cities and towns also live in vulnerable areas 
(Ahmadzadeh et al. 2014: 35). Syrian refugees in Lebanon are placed under comparatively 
challenging conditions, and it is difficult to grasp their living situations compared to other 
countries. This might be the reason why the school enrollment ratio of Syrian refugee children 
in Lebanon appears to be the lowest. The school enrollment condition in Turkey, which is the 
main focus in this study, will be discussed in the next section.
5) In 1998, the percentage of students who went on to secondary education was 74.3% for boys and 68.8% for girls, 
but girls (98.8%) slightly exceeded boys (98.3%) in 2005 (World Bank EdStats).
6) With respect to instructions, though any teaching method could have been applied according to each classroom 
environment, monitoring personnel from the Ministry of Education would visit and monitor the class atmosphere 
and gave instructions on teachers’ method of teaching and their attitudes during the class (Zarad 2014).
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3. Syrian refugees’ lives and education in Turkey
3.1 Turkey’s policy on accepting Syrian refugees
Turkey, which is surrounded by the three regions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, has long been 
a host country for many and diverse refugees from all of these regions; this is why Turkey has 
been referred to as a hub for immigrants including refugees (Mannaert 2003). Turkey has ratified 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) since its conclusion in 
1951, and has not yet removed the geographical conditions for refugee acceptance since then. 
Therefore, Turkey does not provide official refugee status unless refugees are from European 
countries (Government of Turkey 2006).
Acceptance of Syrian refugees has been relatively generous since the onset of the conflict in 
2011, and currently more than 2.2 million people from Syria live all over Turkey (as of November 
2015: UNHCR 2015b). The number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is the largest among the five 
Syria-surrounding countries, and consists of 51% of the entire population. This means that the 
majority of Syrian refugees have been accepted by Turkey. Syrian refugees in Turkey are not 
treated as official refugees, but referred to as “Guests” (Ozden 2013). However, the Directorate 
General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established in April 2014 under Turkey’s 
Ministry of Interior in response to the drastic increase of the Syrian refugee population. 
Registration of Syrian refugees has started, along with official acknowledgement for them to be 
under temporary protection of the Turkish government (DGMM 2014).
The characteristic of the support for Syrian refugees in Turkey is that Turkish actors in the 
country, particularly the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum 
Yönetimi Başkanlığı (in Turkish): AFAD), plays a central role. In other host countries of mass 
Syrian refugees, such as Lebanon and Jordan, UNHCR or other external international refugee 
support organizations are at the core of the humanitarian service. In that sense, Turkey can be 
said to be implementing their own aid strategy for Syrian refugees.
3.2 Schooling of Syrian refugees in Turkey
School-aged Syrian refugees who applied for asylum in Turkey as well as their families are 
stipulated to enroll primary and secondary education even before their application is processed 
(DGMM 2014: 89). They are allowed to enroll in local Turkish schools or Syrian schools7) 
established in and out of camps (UNHCR Turkey 2015). At the time of enrollment to a local 
school, a registration to the Turkish government and either of a residence permit/temporary 
asylum certificate/alien ID is required.
7) Though UNICEF uniformly refers to newly established educational facilities for Syrians in Turkey as “Temporary 
Educational Centers,” this name does not reflect how schools are actually operated (many of them are not 
temporary, and functions more like regular schools than educational centers); accordingly, this paper will use the 
terminology of “Syrian Schools.”
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Many of the refugees residing in camps attend schools that have been established within the 
camp. On the other hand, refugees residing outside of these camps have various options: attend 
to local schools, or Syrian schools. If they choose to go to a Syrian school, they must then decide 
which Syrian school to go. However, in spite of these options, the reality when enrolling or 
transferring to a Turkish local school is that each school may require a certain level of proficiency 
in the Turkish language so that students can keep up with classes, or require a Syrian diploma 
or grade transcript even if the aforementioned requirements are met. Furthermore, even after a 
Syrian child is accepted in local Turkish schools, he/she may be harassed by school managers, 
teachers, or classmates because of their “Syrian” and/or “refugee” label. In this situation, for 
those who live outside of the camp, it is easier to enroll in Syrian schools than local schools. The 
administration conditions of Syrian schools will be discussed in detail based on the fieldwork 
in the following sections, since there is little reliable reference to draw upon for it.
Syrian refugees who have been recognized by UNICEF as students of local school or Syrian 
schools in Turkey are only a total of 210,000, which accounts for about 40% of school-aged 
Syrian children in the country (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2015). Considering that this 
number includes refugee children in camps, the majority of the children outside of the camps are 
possibly not enrolled in schools. However, Syrian schools in non-camp areas were not built by 
Turkish authorities, UNICEF, or other official agencies. Most of them are schools which are 
voluntarily operated by Syrian refugees. Turkish government does not reveal the information 
regarding this kind of school, and UNICEF, who plays the major role as an international 
education aid provider in Turkey, does not have detailed information (UNICEF MENA Regional 
Office 2015). Even the number of Syrian schools operated in Turkey and the number of students 
enrolled are unclear, these schools are not officially registered and the information about these 
schools are scattered (Ibid.: 45). According to the interviews in the fieldwork, there are as many 
as 500 Syrian-managed schools in Turkey. However, these statistics alone are insufficient to 
understanding the actual state of schooling for Syrian refugee children.
4. Outline of the fieldwork in Turkey
The series of fieldwork was conducted for approximately nine weeks in total during the three 
periods of March 8th to 17th in 2013, September 8th to October 5th in 2013, and May 10th to June 
8th in 2015. The primary sites of the fieldwork were the Hatay and Şanlıurfa provinces, which is 
located in southern Turkey on the border with Syria. In Hatay Province, the fieldwork was 
conducted during all the three periods above, but the fieldwork in Şanlıurfa Province took 
place only once in 2015.
4.1 Hatay Province
Hatay Province, with a population of 1.48 million citizens, hosts a registered Syrian refugee 
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population of 200,000, and urban refugees comprise its 93% (Erdogan 2014). The fieldwork in 
the Hatay Province were mainly conducted in the capital city Antakya, and supplementary 
investigations took place in a school in Altinoz city, where a refugee camp is situated. Antakya 
city has a total of seven primary and secondary Syrian schools, and this study targeted four of 
those schools.
There are two characteristics of Hatay Province. One is that this province used to be Syrian 
territory until 1938 after World War I, so with many citizens are able to understand both Turkish 
and Arabic languages and some of them are rooted in Syria. The other is that many people are 
Alawite Muslims, who share the religious belief with the current Syrian president, Bashar 
al-Assad. Since most citizens of the province support the long-standing Assad regime being the 
same religious minority, this background easily puts the province under a state of friction over 
political and religious positions between the local Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees, the latter 
of which are mostly Sunni Muslims who consider themselves to have fled from Assad’s 
oppression, despite sharing Arabic as a common language.
4.2 Şanlıurfa Province
There are approximately 240,000 Syrian refugees registered in Şanlıurfa Province, whose total 
population is 1.76 million (Erdogan 2014). Urban refugees comprise 83%, which means that the 
majority of Syrian refugees in Şanlıurfa lives outside of camps similarly to refugees in Hatay 
(Ibid.). The fieldwork was conducted in the capital city of Şanlıurfa. Two schools out of 11 
primary and secondary schools in the city were investigated, and a pre-primary school were 
targeted as a supplement.
One of the characteristics of Şanlıurfa Province is the abundance of Kurdish citizens, and 
many Syrian refugees who evacuate to this province are also Kurdish. Though there are no 
accurate statistics about the origins of the refugees, nearly half of Syrian refugees residing in 
Şanlıurfa Province are estimated to be Kurdish. Most of them fled from their hometowns at the 
time of the Islamic State’s invasion of Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî in Kurdish) in September of 2014. 
Part of southeast Turkey which includes Şanlıurfa Province, as well as northeastern Syria and 
northwestern Iraq are residential zones for Kurds, and they stretch out over the boundary between 
nations. Many people living in that area, including local Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees, 
share the Kurdish identity. With the background of Kurdish descent and the conservative cultural 
climate of the province, citizens in Şanlıurfa are said to be relatively amicable toward Syrian 
refugee support policies that are promoted by the current Turkish government.
4.3 Basic data of target schools and data-collecting method
The basic information of the target schools are illustrated in Table 1. It is possible to enroll 
in these Syrian schools, even if the children do not meet the conditions that the local Turkish 
schools require. For example, if one has some personal connection with a school there, he/she 
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can, in many cases, be enrolled in the school without documents such as official IDs. There are 
various types of Syrian schools because they do not have comprehensive operational guidelines. 
As for the target schools, many of them are managed renting rooms in residential buildings 
and three to six rooms per floor are allocated for classrooms, teachers’ room and management 
office. A school with sufficient funds can utilize an entire building as a school, but other schools 
rent, for instance, only the 2nd and 4th floors as part of the school, and the other floors, such as 
the 1st and 3rd floors, are occupied by ordinary Turkish families.
In each school, semi-structured interviews, narrative interviews, and observations in 
classrooms and teachers’ room were conducted. The interviews were conducted with school 
managers (1 to 2 from each school), teachers (5 to 7 from each school) and students (10 to 15 
from each school). What was asked were issues necessary to understand basic information 
regarding the school administrational situation (stakeholders’ backgrounds and their number, 
school schedule, methods of instruction and teaching materials to use, circumstances of external 
supports, etc.), as well as their efforts and issues regarding school establishment and operation, 
and the relationship between Turkish governmental organizations and other Syrian schools. 
Aside from the school, parents and families of students, graduates of Syrian schools, and Syrian 
refugees living around the schools were approached for interviews to investigate their 
perspectives on school education as well as the impact of schools on their lives.
5. Educational system of Syrian schools operated outside of the camps
5.1 Curriculum and textbook creation by Syrian actors
Syrian actors mainly include managers, teachers and students of Syrian schools, as well as an 
organization that calls itself the “Syrian Education Commission (SEC)” and an organization that 
calls itself the Ministry of Education (MoE) of the “Syrian Interim Government (SIG).” They 








No. of teachers 
(no. of F)
No. of students 
(no. of F)
A Antakya September, 2011 Grade 1–8 Free 51 (45) 790 (418)
B Antakya September, 2011 Grade 9–12 100 21 (10) 368 (205)
C Antakya January, 2013 Grade 1–9 30 23 (21) 470 (300)
D Antakya April, 2013 Grade 1–12 230 59 (31) 630 (—)
E Altinoz February, 2014 Grade 1–12 30 32 (—) 600 (—)
F Şanlıurfa August, 2012 Grade 1–6 Free 36 (26) 1,188 (523)
G Şanlıurfa October, 2013 Grade 7–12 Free 16 (7) 300 to 400 (—)
H Şanlıurfa December, 2013 (2–5 years old) 120 5 (5) 45 (—)
Note: Tuition indicates yearly payment amounts. TL = Turkish lira (1TL = approximately 0.38 USD).
(—) indicates there is no data.
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influence all aspects of education for all Syrian refugees in Turkey. SEC was formed by Syrian 
educational affiliates, including refugees, in February of 2013; it aimed to expand educational 
opportunities for Syrian refugee children. It is registered and has been approved as a NPO by the 
Turkish government. While SEC is an organization specialized in education, SIG is a political 
organization established in 2013 under the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces, which started in Doha in 2012. SIG is, under the slogan of an “anti-Syrian 
regime,” supported by various countries, such as the U.S. and gulf states, which are against the 
current Syrian regime and has a strong cooperation with Turkish government both overtly and 
covertly. Within the SIG, the MoE is comparatively new, and was established in November of 
2014. These newly established organizations do not represent all the Syrian schools, but both 
create new curriculums based on those of Syria. Detailed curriculums (subjects, number of 
hours by subject, instruction contents, etc.) are set forth by each Syrian school and its teachers 
based on its own policies, philosophies, and educational resources such as number of teachers 
per subject. Many schools omit subjects that are not reflected in examination performance, 
such as music or P.E., depending on whether or not school equipment, teaching material, or 
teachers for the subject are available. Currently, managing or monitoring systems for changes 
in these curriculums do not exist.
The biggest change with respect to curriculums is that Turkish language classes have already 
been introduced into every Syrian school before the creation of the curriculum by SEC and SIG’s 
MoE. This was a measure taken due to the anticipation by many Syrian refugees that children 
would likely have to stay in Turkey for a long period of time due to the conflict being prolonged 
in their home country. In Syria, English and French language classes start from primary level, 
but many Syrian schools in Turkey teach Turkish instead of French. Currently, those who teach 
Turkish language at Syrian schools are mostly Turkish personnel allocated by the Turkish 
regional education office. While the average salary for Syrian teachers is in the range between 
unpaid to 600 TL (approximately 227 USD), these Turkish language teachers are paid 3,500 TL 
(approximately 1,324 USD) a month from the regional education office. The relationships 
between these Turkish language teachers and other Syrian school staff vary by school. For 
example, in School B, Syrians did not try to have active communication with the Turkish 
language teacher as they have determined that they cannot make themselves understood because 
of the language barrier. While other teachers chatted with each other in the teachers’ room, the 
Turkish language teacher sat alone silently. An manager of School D (male, 50’s) mentioned the 
salary gap between Syrian teachers and Turkish language teachers, and complained: “we work 
in the same school, so why the difference?” Meanwhile, at School E, a Turkish language teacher 
was teaching Turkish to Syrian teachers after school for free; this Turkish teacher’s relationship 
with Syrian managers and teachers was well-maintained.
Textbooks are published in Turkey by SEC and SIG’s MoE. SEC published the latest edition 
of textbooks in 2013, and SIG’s MoE followed suit in 2014. Although both textbooks are free 
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and there is no remarkable difference in their contents, many Syrian schools use the latter, which 
is newer. One reason why schools adopt curriculums and textbooks by SIG’s MoE is the 
baccalaureate that Syrian students take at the time of graduation from the Syrian secondary 
school. Since 2014, SIG became the actor which implements the baccalaureate.
The textbooks edited by SEC and SIG’s MoE both cover every fundamental point that the 
Syrian textbooks do in their home country. However, subjects related to Syrian history, politics, 
and other subjects that cover sociological events such as social studies, history, and political 
science have been modified or deleted with respect to descriptions or photos of the current 
regime and the president. Particularly in the subject named “Political Science,” there are many 
references to the Assad regime and the Ba’ath Party. Because of that, some school managers 
replaced the subject with a Moral Education class (School A and B). A majority of Syrian 
refugees residing in the targeted areas consider their reason for forced migration out of the 
country to be oppression or persecution by the current Syrian regime. Therefore, modifying 
contents of classes and description on textbooks which treat the Assad regime and the Ba’ath 
Party as the national foundation of Syria can be considered as an expression of opposition by 
Syrian refugee actors against the current regime, as well as an emergence of a developing 
ideology that is being formed at the new location to which they have evacuated.
This being said, a school manager (School F, female, 29 years old) who adopted the textbook 
by SIG’s MoE in her school made the justification that “our school has nothing to do with SIG. 
This is the only textbook available in Turkey (Syrians can’t use Turkey’s local textbook because 
it is written in Turkish), so we have to use it.” SIG is an organization that is strongly political in 
nature. School officials do not necessarily consider a close relationship with SEC or SIG’s MoE 
to be strictly beneficial. Each school has built a partially-cooperative relationship with necessary 
organizations in necessary fields based on their operational conditions and interests, in order 
to maintain voluntary and strategic management of their schools.
5.2 Relationship between Turkish governmental organizations and Syrian actors
Education for Syrian refugees in Turkey is said to be under the jurisdiction of Turkey’s 
Ministry of National Education (MoNE) as well as the regional education office. Deployed 
personnel from the central government have been stationed in the regional education office, 
and it maintains close coordination with the government.
School administration by Syrian refugees was managed primarily independently and outside 
of the jurisdiction of the Turkish authority until 2013 since their emergence in late 2011. With 
respect to this independence, the Turkish authority, especially the regional education office, 
often overlooked it despite knowing the existence of Syrian schools. At the time, Syrian schools, 
which had not been approved by any authorities of Turkey nor Syria, were accepting children 
under an unstable condition wherein they could have been forced to close at any time. School A, 
which was established in September of 2011, was forced to close twice by the regional education 
148
OSAKA HUMAN SCIENCES
office up until 2012 (Yamamoto et al. 2013).
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities changed their stance towards Syrian schools after mid-2014. 
The regional education office began dispatching a Turkish official, referred to as “coordinators,” 
to each Syrian school to collect basic information about the school, including the number of 
students and teachers as well as their personal information. These coordinators were called 
“Turkish eyes” by Syrian teachers because they considered the coordinators to be monitoring 
them. Though these teachers complained that these coordinators do not provide direct support 
to the school administration, they also expressed that “as long as there is a coordinator in the 
school, there is no risk of the school being closed.” Coordinators are dispatched to Syrian schools 
to monitor them, which leads to a minimum assurance for sustainable school administration.
A manager of School A (male, 40’s) explained the reason why Turkish authorities changed 
their stances toward Syrian schools as follows: “we visited the regional education office so 
many times to ask for the approval of school management by Syrians. No matter how many 
times we were closed down, we rose back up… They (the Turkish authority) had no choice but 
to acknowledge us.” From his narratives, we can see his strong sense of authority in the school 
management, as well as pride in being an agent of change to transform the system in which 
they manage Syrian schools in Turkey.
In the case of School F, which was established in August of 2012, the involvement of the 
regional education office was a larger issue. After a Turkish coordinator was deployed to the 
school, the original Syrian manager was discharged from his position and a new Syrian who was 
appointed by the coordinator took over. Since then, more than half of the 18 Syrian teachers, 
who had been involved in the establishment of the school, resigned from School F and transferred 
to other Syrian schools. Of the original teachers at School F, there were only seven teachers who 
remain working there, and the other teachers were newly employed after 2014. School F’s new 
Syrian manager (aforementioned), who was appointed in January of 2015, said that “the Turkish 
educational system is more modern than the Syrian system,” and expressed a more positive 
attitude towards the operation policy by the Turkish authority.
Involvement of Turkish authorities in Syrian schools differs between School A in Hatay 
Province and School F in Şanlıurfa Province. Though Syrian managers in both schools displayed 
an affirmative attitude towards the Turkish authorities, these attitudes are fundamentally 
different. The manager of School A had this to say about the Turkish coordinator: “he trusts us, 
so he leaves the school management to us.” The manager accepted the Turkish authority’s 
involvement in the school on the premise that it preserved the independence of Syrian actors. 
On the flipside, the manager of School F is submissive to policies formed by the Turkish 
authorities. The depth of involvement by the Turkish authority is different among schools, given 
the attitudes of the Syrian managers and the Turkish authorities towards each other, as well 
as the relationship between them.
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5.3 Global support for Syrian schools by organizations and individuals
Intervention from international organizations such as UN agencies is rarely done in Turkey, 
and Syrians and the Turkish authorities undertake the core of educational activities. For Syrian 
schools with a small resource that are operated by refugees, external material and financial 
supports are essential. Individuals and organizations that provide support for Syrian schools 
can be categorized into the following four groups: (1) International organizations in charge of 
refugee/educational support such as UNHCR and UNICEF, and other national and international 
humanitarian assistance organizations, (2) Local NGOs in Turkey, (3) Syrian groups located in 
and out of the country, and (4) Individual volunteers. The organizations that belong to (1) and 
(2) are approved their humanitarian activities in Turkey by the Turkish government, but as for a 
majority of the groups and individuals of (3) and (4) are not.
Supports from (1) International organizations and (2) Local NGOs consisted not only of 
material aids such as bags, shoes, stationery, and textbooks, but also of teacher salaries of 
amounts up to 220 TL (approximately 82 USD) per month from UNICEF (School C, D, F and 
G). However, these forms of support were mostly given sporadically and within a limited period 
of time, which is insufficient to provide fundamental support for sustainable school management. 
On the other hand, (3) Syrian groups and (4) Individual volunteers often share the same political 
or religious ideologies with school managers, and those forms of support are continuously 
provided. Unfortunately, most of them are supporting Syrian schools non-officially because 
these groups or individuals are not approved by the Turkish government.
Furthermore, even supporters who are providing continuous support for a Syrian school 
focus on large-scale incidents in Syria as they occur, which frequently diverts support away from 
the schools. The long-lasting chaos within Syria, which still sees no signs of resolution, is 
negatively impacting the sustainable school management even beyond the border. Moreover, 
since the Turkish government’s involvement was enhanced after 2014, it became more difficult 
to receive supports from individuals or groups that have not gained approval in Turkey. Because 
of this restriction from Turkish government, Syrian school stakeholders have to follow 
complicated procedures in order to raise necessary funds. Sometimes they obtain international 
donations through individuals who have bank accounts in Turkey and serve as a mediator. 
Consequently, their source of income has continued to shrink since intensification of involvement 
of the Turkish government.
Many Syrian schools do not explicitly disclose sources of income and its receiving process. 
On their accounting reports, these issues are only described as “large amount of funds granted 
from generous volunteers,” with no description of the background of those “volunteers” or their 
relationship with the school, nor a clear indication of the individual donated amounts. For 
example, a school manager (male, 40’s) of a certain Syrian school had a Syrian friend living in 
Saudi Arabia, who financed rent for the school building as well as salaries for the teachers. His 
donation accounted for more than 15,950 TL (approximately 6,000 USD) per month (Yamamoto 
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et al. 2013). Tracing back the relationship between the donor and the manager of School B, it 
was found that they had worked together as anti-government activists in Syria before they left 
the country. If these school managers’ backgrounds are exposed to the public, not only will the 
impartiality of the school administration come under suspicion, but also the undercover militia 
of the Syrian regime in the area may find these school officials and send them back to Syria to 
apprehend, put into custody, or put under much more severe dangers. Despite being displaced 
in other countries, refugees who reside especially in nearby bordering areas have not completely 
escaped the context of conflict. Given this background, it is extremely difficult to verify the 
flow of Syrian school’s funds.
5.4 Ensuring diploma certificates and its instablity involving various actors
Most Syrian refugees who enroll in Syrian school up to secondary education usually hope 
to proceed to higher education. How to make Syrian students’ diploma certificates ensure 
advancement to higher education is extremely important issue for those involved in the school, 
including students, parents, teachers, and managers.
Many individuals who graduated from Syrian schools during the academic year 2013/2014 
(September of 2013 to August of 2014) have diploma certificates that were issued by the Libyan 
government. Based on common political and religious ideologies, being against the Assad 
regime as well as being part of the Sunni branch of Islam, Libyan authorities have formed a 
coalition with Syrian schools since the middle of 2013. In order to obtain this diploma, Syrian 
schools in Turkey introduced the Libyan curriculum as well as Libyan textbooks to classes for 
students in 12th grade, which is the highest grade in secondary education, or one year before it, 
and then took the Libyan diploma certificate. However, due to unstable situations in Libya and 
the Turkish authorities’ intensified involvement in Syrian schools, diploma certificate issued by 
SIG’s MoE has been granted in cooperation with AFAD and MoNE since the academic year of 
2014/2015 (September of 2014 through August of 2015). Syrian refugee students who will 
advance to universities in Turkey after the 2014/2015 academic year are required this diploma 
certificate issue by SIG.
Let’s take a look at this systematic change regarding diploma in line with the case of J 
(male, 19 years old). J, who graduated from School D in August of 2014, was granted a diploma 
certificate by the Libyan government. He studied hard for the baccalaureate and earned a high 
score of 94% average of all subjects in 2014. However, this was not enough to advance to 
university, so J started preparing for university enrollment in the next year (2015) by taking the 
Turkish language proficiency exam (TOMER) as well as the university entrance examination 
for foreign students (YOS). Despite all of his efforts, J was informed at the beginning of June 
of 2015 that certificates issued by the Libyan government had become invalid for university 
entrance examinations after 2014/2015, so he had to take the baccalaureate again to acquire 
SIG’s certificate. By that time, J had already spent a whole year after graduating secondary 
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school to obtain his qualification for university entrance. Moreover, the baccalaureate was to be 
held at the end of June, though university entrances would occur in September; it would be up 
in the air as to whether or not he would be able to obtain the results of the baccalaureate during 
the university application period. Supposing that his baccalaureate examination results were 
found to be valid, it would be difficult for J to score better in the baccalaureate than the previous 
year with a preparation period of less than a month. As he realized these disadvantages, he 
remained silent for a while, and finally said, angrily: “being born smart in a stupid country results 
in nothing.” After this, J talked to a teacher at School B (male, 30’s). Though this was the first 
time the teacher had ever heard of a case like this, he didn’t seem surprised. He stated an 
overarching issue that Syrian schools have: “the problem is that we don’t know what problems 
we have. Nobody tells us what we should do. What was valid a week ago becomes invalid a 
week after.”
Just like the issues regarding diploma certificate that many other refugees around the world 
face8), the effectiveness of SIG’s certificate is not universal. Because this particular diploma 
certificate is granted by the Turkish government and SIG, which stand strongly against the 
current Syrian regime, when the holder of this certification returns to Syria, the certificate is 
found valid in areas that are controlled by anti-governmental groups. On the other hand, there 
have been cases where the certificate holder was arrested in an area controlled by the government, 
just for having said certificate. Under the context that the refugees are put under, these certificates 
emphasize the political aspects of the school education, and automatically add a political 
significance onto the students. This can not only impact children’s education, but also be a 
security as well as a threat to their lives and ways of living.
6. Two faces of functions supporting Syrian school operation
Based on the research results in the previous section, the actors involved in the management 
of Syrian schools established outside of refugee camps can be categorized into Syrian actors, 
Turkish governmental organizations, and supporters in and out of the country. In Turkey, where 
there is no uniform education system, each party and organization support the sustainable 
management of Syrian schools while fulfilling their respective functions (Figure 1). However, 
not all of the functions of each actor necessarily bring about desirable impacts.
Due to the functions of SEC and SIG’s MoE, Syrian refugee children became able to learn in 
Arabic, their first language, and their original curriculum in Turkey, and were able to simply 
receive diploma certificates. Furthermore, implementation of the baccalaureate by SIG’s MoE 
8) Aside from the government, educational certificates for refugees may be given by UN agencies, but the validity of 
these certificates varies depending on the country and situation. For example, a school in a Rwandan refugee camp 
in Tanzania was granted certificate by UNHCR and UNICEF, but when the graduates returned to Rwanda, the 
Rwandan government did not approve these certificates (Bird 2003: 39).
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allowed the Turkish government, who has close connections with SIG, to obtain more accurate 
information regarding Syrian schools within Turkey, which had been more difficult in the past 
when they were managed independently. However, as Syrian school managers have already 
pointed out, some of the uniquely modified educational contents show signs of political 
favoritism, which is not completely approvable for Syrian school managers and teachers. 
Additionally, the validity of certifications that are approved based on unclear relationships 
between SIG and the Turkish government is not yet uniform. Though Libyan certificates that 
were granted for the graduates until 2013/2014 used to be internationally valid, SIG certificates 
are only considered valid within a limited area, such as Turkey, where SIG is acknowledged. 
Limited effectiveness of certificate could hinder the scope of refugee children’s migration to 
other countries, and narrows their options with respect to lifestyle.
While the Turkish authority’s involvement in Syrian schools functions to ensure the sustainable 
operations of each school, officials in Syrian schools have emphasized the perspective of this 
involvement that their school management being monitored. This is a result of many regulations 
that come along with the country’s involvement. The Turkish authority’s involvement in Syrian 
schools is described as “support” and “cooperation,” and is praised by external agencies including 
UNICEF as a generous policy toward Syrian refugees. On the other hand, such “intervention” 
diminishes the scope of discretionary power that the Syrian school actors hold. Consequently, 
FiGure 1.
The structure surrounding Syrian schools in urban areas of Turkey (as of June 2015)
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with respect to securing sources for funds, obtaining support from groups or individuals who 
were not approved by the Turkish government became more difficult. Those who had provided 
continuous support to many Syrian schools were neither members of the Turkish government 
nor members of any international organizations, but were rather unapproved groups and 
individual volunteers. Thus, the acquisition of funds for Syrian schools became unstable, and 
problems have emerged regarding operational foundations.
Up to now, as for education for urban refugees, integration into local schools of the host 
country was considered the best option. Under the circumstances where enrollment in local 
schools was possible, refugee schools in cities and towns were deemed to be an alternative 
option, and the actual conditions of these schools were seldom clarified. With this as a 
background, the Syrian schools that was focused on in this study seemed to be becoming stable 
as time went on due to back-up from the Turkish authorities, and seemed to be systematically 
attempting sustainable management. This tendency towards stabilization is positively regarded 
by external viewpoints, but it is necessary to be aware that this tendency has two faces. Depending 
on the angle from which this situation is regarded, the situation reveals many different sides; 
depending on the perspective, this stabilization might be promoting and hindering the operational 
sustainment of Syrian schools.
Concluding remarks
The target areas of this study are located close to the Syrian border in Turkey, where conflict 
has impacted people’s lives across the border. The social system surrounding Syrian refugees in 
the areas is strongly influenced by the political and social conditions of not only Turkey but also 
Syria. Due to both the underdevelopment and the fluctuation of the system, operational founda-
tions of Syrian schools, along with the lives of Syrian refugees (individuals and families), have 
been forced into instability. A teacher described current circumstances as “instability that kills 
people.” Currently, enrolling in Syrian schools does not always guarantee advancing opportunities 
in the future. It is not true in the current situation to say that Syrian schools are living up to the 
strong educational fervor that refugees have towards advancing to higher education. The gap 
between educational needs and school management tells us that it is difficult to support school 
education solely through efforts by refugees.
Many Syrians who engage in school management under these conditions say that it is 
challenging to operate schools in Turkey. At the same time, a Syrian mother said that “you cannot 
live a good life without education.” Yet, a school manager expressed frustration while trying to 
bear responsibility for children’s education and expressed his feelings by saying that “we can’t 
lose this (school-aged) generation.” It remains true that the efforts by people like those above have 
enabled refugees who are not even able to get support from public organizations or international 
agencies to gain access to education through the form of refugee’s self-support attempts.
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With respect to limitations of this study, there was an absence of reliable documents and 
materials regarding overall regulations/rules such as policy documents, which normally exist; 
therefore, the study had to rely on unofficial information sources such as interviews. However, 
the absence of these comprehensive documents and systems itself is what characterizes this 
independently-operated school education for refugees, and is the reason for why it is necessary 
to accumulate this type of research. Another limitation was that the targets of interviews 
tended to be only Syrian school stakeholders. In further studies, it is necessary to grasp the 
dynamics of comprehensive school administration by Syrian refugees in Turkey through 
investigation of both Turkish and Syrian actors who are engaging in educational administration, 
including their development of systems regarding Syrian refugees’ education in Turkey, 
curriculum creation, and so forth. Even despite these limitations, this study made an attempt, 
using qualitative methods, towards understanding the comprehensive structure of schools 
operated by refugees, which had previously been overlooked in previous studies which 
emphasized the view that integration into local schools of host countries was ideal and found 
that refugee-run schools was of “poor quality” based on insufficient evidence. This attempt 
should be recognized as the significance of this study.
The school administration activities conducted by Syrian refugees that have been elucidated 
in this article are very dynamic. These trends, which show various developments over a short 
amount of time, have greatly contributed to enrollment of Syrian refugee children. Within this 
framework, refugees are not just beneficiaries of support activities, nor are they merely victims 
of conflict. Understanding them as active agents and accumulating studies on their characteristics 
as parties that are directly involved in the educational issues will become even more important.
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